The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has structurally raised the floor for freight rates, with bunker costs exceeding 60% and war risk coverage becoming difficult to obtain. For Italian exporters, the real risk is contractual and competitive, not just related to tariffs.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis is no longer a temporary shock: it is structurally reshaping maritime transport costs. Since February 28, 2024, the conflict involving Israel, the United States, and Iran has altered global routes, not just those in the Gulf. The true danger for exporters is not the peak in costs, but their permanent instability over time. Surcharges are accumulating, freight rates remain high even outside the Middle East, and insurance availability is progressively thinning. This article goes beyond the numbers to analyze the contractual and competitive implications for those exporting today.
The Capacity Paradox in the Gulf
The Strait of Hormuz crisis began on February 28, 2026, when Israel and the United States struck Iran. Tehran responded by imposing military control over the passage, which normally carries one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas. Before the conflict, one hundred and thirty to one hundred and forty ships passed through daily. As of August 4, 2026, barely six pass through. Traffic has alternated between almost total closures, reopenings, and new closures, following the fluctuating trend of diplomatic negotiations. Approximately six thousand seafarers and five hundred ships remain blocked in the Gulf. Here, the first counterintuitive fact emerges, often ignored by operators. Gulf ships account for about 2% of global container capacity: an apparently marginal impact. Yet, effective global capacity has dropped by nearly 19%. The reason is the forced diversion around the Cape of Good Hope, which adds 3,500–4,000 nautical miles and 10–14 days per voyage. Every diverted ship remains immobilized for longer, removing hold space from all other routes. Maritime networks are interconnected: a local blockage generates a shortage of ships and containers everywhere. This explains why freight rates remain high even on routes that do not touch the Gulf. For import-export operators, the consequence is clear. The bottleneck is not port congestion, but the route risk that immobilizes the global fleet.
Bunker Costs: Why They Won’t Go Back
Bunker costs remain the heaviest item, but they must be read in a structural, not just cyclical, light. At the beginning of August, Fujairah, the main hub in the Gulf, quoted VLSFO at approximately $919.50 per ton: 54% above Rotterdam. Singapore stands at $712.50, the global average at $703.00, compared to $596.50 in Rotterdam. The Fujairah premium is the clearest trace of the crisis. The hub absorbs both the direct cost of disruption and the conflict risk. Before the war, the gap with Rotterdam was only a few percentage points. The price trajectory has been a roller coaster linked to escalation. In March, the VLSFO average across the twenty main hubs rose by up to 91% year-on-year. In mid-June, during the de-escalation, it had dropped to +23%. On July 22, hostilities resumed and bunker costs rose again. At the beginning of August, they remain about 60% above the February baseline. But the strategic point is different. Even a reopening of Hormuz would not bring freight rates back to pre-crisis levels. The diversion around the Cape keeps ships at sea longer and sets a high floor for bunker costs. Analysts speak of a “new floor” for freight, not a return to normalcy. For those planning a fuel budget, a specific quote becomes obsolete in two to four weeks.
Chart 1 — VLSFO Bunker Costs: % change compared to pre-crisis baseline (source: Lloyd’s List Intelligence, Ship & Bunker)
War Risk Insurance: The Risk is Availability
War risk insurance is the other major cost item, but here the real problem is not just the price. Before the war, the premium for a seven-day transit in the Gulf was worth about 0.25% of the hull value. For a ship worth one hundred million dollars, this meant $250,000. At the beginning of March, at the height of the shock, war risk insurance rose to 2.5–3%, or $2.5–3.0 million. Between July 17 and 22, it reached 7.5–10% of the hull value. But the most insidious fact is another: some insurers have completely withdrawn coverage for the Hormuz transit. In those moments, no premium, no matter how high, guaranteed the protection of the ship. The availability of the guarantee, not just its cost, has become the critical variable. This changes the nature of the risk for the freight forwarder. A cargo may prove uninsurable at any price during an acute escalation phase. S&P Global Platts valued the transport of a crude oil cargo from the Gulf to China at $77.96 per ton. The reading is from July 22–23. The value is four times the five-year average of $18.91. For high-value cargoes, war risk insurance can exceed the cost of the fuel itself. The lesson is clear: without coverage, some shipments simply do not depart.
Chart 2 — War Risk Insurance: premium as % of hull value (source: Insurance Journal, S&P Global, The National, AGBI)
Surcharges, Incoterms, and Contractual Exposure
For the international supply chain, the most underestimated aspect is the accumulation mechanism of surcharges. Carriers have introduced a new category, the Emergency Conflict Surcharge, which ranges from $2,000 to $4,000 per container. This is added to the War Risk Surcharge, the Emergency Bunker Surcharge, and the quarterly Bunker Adjustment Factor. All these items can appear together on the same booking. Surcharges accumulate; they do not offset each other. The all-in cost of a container on some Asia-Gulf routes has more than doubled. This is where the real contractual risk for the Italian exporter arises. Those who sell with CIF or CFR terms assume the variability of freight and surcharges. A contract signed at a fixed price can erode the entire margin if surcharges explode after signing. The choice of Incoterm therefore becomes a financial decision, not just a logistical one. Added to this is a visibility problem: “dark” transits, without an AIS signal, are increasingly common. The position data on which the international supply chain relies is becoming unreliable. Equipment is also scarce: containers remain stuck in the Gulf and do not return to rotation. The international supply chain must therefore work with larger safety stocks and surcharge transfer clauses. A buffer of 60–90 days of stock, once considered excessive, is now operational prudence.
Conclusions
The strategic question is not how much costs will rise, but how to negotiate in a structurally unstable market. Waiting for a return to pre-crisis levels is a losing bet. The diversion around the Cape has raised the floor for freight rates in a likely lasting way. The winner is the one who redesigns Incoterms, clauses, and stock policies around volatility, rather than the one who suffers it. There is also a silent competitive effect that deserves attention. The crisis penalizes above all goods with a high weight-to-value ratio, where freight significantly impacts the final price. For Italian industry, this touches a raw nerve: valves, hydraulic components, machinery, and construction materials have margins exposed to this very dynamic. An increase in freight can make an Italian product no longer competitive compared to suppliers closer to the target markets. Conversely, high-value, low-weight goods, such as medical devices and precision components, remain relatively protected. The Strait of Hormuz crisis is therefore reshaping the map of competitiveness by sector and destination. For an SME exporting to the Middle East, Central Asia, or North Africa, the answer is not to cut markets. It is necessary to calculate the real landed cost for each product line. Only in this way can one decide where to defend margins, where to pass costs on to the customer, and where, if necessary, to suspend operations.